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Caste at the City’s Edge: Land
Struggles in Peri-urban Bengaluru
Carol Upadhya and Sachinkumar Rathod
This paper draws on fieldwork carried out between 2017 and 2020 as part of the project
“Speculative Urbanism: Land, Livelihoods, and Finance Capital,” in collaboration with the
University of Minnesota, funded by the National Science Foundation [grant
number BCS-1636437]. We thank our colleagues Vinay Gidwani, Michael Goldman, Hemangini
Gupta, Eric Sheppard, Helga Leitner, and other members of the research team for many
discussions and debates. Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the Third Annual
Research Conference of the Indian Institute for Human Settlements, Bengaluru, January 10–12,
2019; in the panel on The Peri-urban Question: Renewing Concepts and Categories at
RC21@Delhi, September 18–20, 2019; and at the French Institute of Pondicherry, February 13,
2020. We are grateful to the organizers and participants of those conferences for their valuable
feedback, as well as to the anonymous referees for their constructive comments. All photos are by
Pierre Hauser, who we sincerely thank for allowing us to use his work. 
1 On one of  our first  days of  fieldwork on the south-eastern fringe of  Bengaluru,  we
encountered two individuals who became key interlocutors in our study of the peri-
urban land transition. While driving around the area observing land use changes, we
spotted four men who had parked their motorcycles, and were walking into an empty
plot of land adjacent to the road. Thinking that they might be discussing a land deal, we
tried to strike up a conversation. It turned out that two of the party were indeed local
brokers—“Shekhar,” a young man, and his uncle “Nagappa”1—who were inspecting a
plot of land for sale.  After we told them about our planned research on real estate
development in peri-urban villages, they agreed to speak with us and we settled down
on the steps of a closed shop. With little prompting, Shekhar and Nagappa began telling
us  about  the  rampant  “land-grabbing”  that  was  occurring  in  the  area,  especially
“encroachments” on government land by members of the powerful Reddy community.
Offering to show us an example, they led us down a lonely rural road till we came to a
large barren piece of land on which a number of cricket pitches had been marked out.
Shekhar explained that this was once gomala land (common land used for grazing or
Caste at the City’s Edge: Land Struggles in Peri-urban Bengaluru
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 26 | 2021
1
other public purposes), which had been appropriated by a local Reddy family by bribing
the  Village  Accountant  to  manipulate  the  land  records.  The  usurpers  first  planted
eucalyptus on the plot, but later decided to turn it into a cricket ground. The “owners”
rent out the pitches to “techies” (software engineers) employed in nearby IT parks,
who come to play cricket on the weekends. As we continued to drive around the area,
they pointed out other examples of encroachments, especially gomala land turned into
residential “layouts.”
2 Subsequently,  during  our  fieldwork,  we  heard  about  many  such  cases  of  “land-
grabbing” (the English term has been absorbed into ordinary Kannada speech), and we
also learned about the struggle that was being waged by local Dalits against what they
view  as  the  illicit  activities  of  Reddys.  Prompted  by  these  stories,  we  began  to
investigate the caste conflict that seemed to be unfolding on the canvas of a booming
land market. While there are many dimensions to the peri-urban land transition, in this
paper we focus on the contested appropriation and conversion of land by powerful
actors and the caste politics that has crystallized around these processes. In the stories
about the urban land transition that we recorded, caste appeared time and again—as a
form of social power that has allowed certain actors to capture the most benefit from
the activation of land markets, and as the language through which struggles around
land  were  narrated  and  pursued. We  describe  the  contestations  that  have  erupted
around land as it is transformed from a productive asset in an agrarian economy to a
key financial asset in a speculative urban economy (Goldman 2011), and explore how
caste is reconfigured, invoked and respatialized through these struggles.
3 In  the  next  section,  we  locate  our  ethnography  in  relation  to  recent  work  on
postcolonial  urbanism,  land  struggles  and  the  peri-urban  in  south  Asia.  Section  3
describes Bengaluru’s real estate-led urban transformation, the changes in this peri-
urban  site,  and  the  engagement  of  Reddys  and  Dalits  in  the  land  market.  It  also
provides a brief background on the agrarian political economy of the Mysore region to
contextualize the discussion that follows. In the fourth section we describe how “land-
grabbing” takes place,  situating the dispossession of  Dalits  and the privatization of
common lands within the wider politics of land in Bengaluru. Section 5 explores the
modalities through which Dalits have challenged the social power of Reddys in this
context, and reinserts these land struggles in their regional context by exploring the
place-embedded  caste  identities  that  inform  struggles  around  land.  The  paper
concludes by arguing that caste should be at the center of analyses of urbanization and
the land transition in India.
 
Agrarian Urbanism and the Land Transition
4 Postcolonial  urban scholars  have  argued that  received theories  of  urbanization are
inadequate to capture the complexities and varieties of urban forms in cities of the
global  South  (Robinson 2016;  Roy 2011),  where  the  “urban  question”  is  also  the
“agrarian  question”  (Roy 2016).  Gururani  (2019)  proposes  the  concept  of  “agrarian
urbanism” to capture an “urbanism in which agrarian regimes of land and property
endure and coproduce the urban” (p. 14). This concept is particularly relevant on the
“urbanizing  frontiers”  (Gururani  2019)  of  south  Asia  where  the  “feverish  non-
metrocentric  remapping  of  the  urban-agrarian  hinterland”  is  marked  by  a
“heterogeneous politics of land” (Gururani and Dasgupta 2018:41).
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5 To capture the entanglements of the agrarian and the urban, we need to be attentive to
the  specific  regional  locations  and  histories  of  south  Asian  cities  (Nair 2013).  In
postcolonial settings, the urban transition is highly uneven and non-linear, socially as
well as spatially, such that regional “agrarian regimes of territory, land and property
are implicated and inscribed in ongoing urban land use changes” (Balakrishnan 2019:2).
Landholding  and  agricultural  production  have  historically  been  grounded  in  caste
(Lerche  and  Shah 2018;  Mosse 2018),  albeit  with  significant  regional  variations
(Lerche 2015), which means that such an analysis must attend to the intersections of
caste  and  land  within  particular  agrarian  formations.  To  develop  a  deeper
understanding of the contemporary politics of land in urbanizing peripheries, we need
to draw on the large body of work on caste in sociology and social anthropology as well
as the long tradition of agrarian studies in south Asia (Gururani 2019).
6 Work on peri-urban sites across south Asia have provided fine-grained illustrations of
how the social logics of older agrarian formations are reconstituted and reflected in
new  contestations,  as  rural  communities  are  absorbed  into  expanding  cities  and
agricultural  land  is  commoditized  (Anwar 2018;  Kundu 2016;  Sarkar 2015).  The
activation of speculative land markets by urbanizing processes or land acquisition has
complex  and  contradictory  outcomes  (Cross 2015;  Shatkin 2016;  Upadhya 2020),  but
most  research  points  to  the  widening  of  class  and  caste  inequalities.  While  large
farmers may profit significantly from skyrocketing land prices, landless workers and
marginal and tenant farmers tend to lose their livelihoods and access to land (Agarwal
and Levien 2019; Vijayabaskar and Menon 2018). In addition, erstwhile cultivators and
landlords often benefit from their new roles in the expanding peri-urban economy—as
brokers,  moneylenders,  real  estate  agents,  or  rentier  landlords  (Cowan 2018;
De Neve 2015;  Dubey 2018;  Nelson 2018;  Sampat 2017).  Not  surprisingly,  local  actors
who mediate the insertion of rural economies into multi-scalar circuits of accumulation
are usually drawn from the dominant landowning castes (Balakrishnan 2018; Das 2019;
Kennedy 2019; Levien 2015; Pati 2017), who transform their control over land into new
forms of “caste capital” (Bandyopadhyay 2016; Deshpande 2013).
7 This literature highlights the reproduction of economic inequalities and caste power as
agriculture is disrupted and land becomes primarily a source of financial value, yet the
shifting intersections of caste and land as rural communities urbanize have not been
closely mapped. As Gururani (2019:14) suggests, more attention must be paid to the
mutual constitution, reconfigurations and fracturing of the relations between land and
caste in peri-urban villages, and to how these changes “produce an uneven geography
of spatial value.” For example, Balakrishnan (2019) shows how agrarian elites in the
Maharashtra sugar belt have leveraged their accumulated political and social capital to
become “key protagonists in the making of urban real estate markets in liberalizing
India” (p. 15). Theorizing these processes as “recombinant urbanization,” she argues
that “agrarian-urban land transformations are undergirded by the persistence of caste
networks” (p. 14).
8 While other scholars have similarly conceptualized the operations of caste within the
modern  Indian  economy  as  social  networks  that  create  monopolies  in  particular
markets,  Mosse  (2018:432)  argues  that  reducing  caste  to  social  networks  elides  the
multiple  ways  in  which  power  and resources  (especially  land)  are  sequestered  and
deployed  through  caste  (cf.  Mosse 2019).  More  work  is  needed  to  understand  the
protean nature of caste and its multiple manifestations in changing contexts. In this
Caste at the City’s Edge: Land Struggles in Peri-urban Bengaluru
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 26 | 2021
3
paper  we  explore  how  caste,  as  a  key  “social  structure  of  accumulation”  (Harriss-
White 2003)  in  the  agrarian  economy,  is  repurposed  to  capture  value  from
(financialized)  land  and  also  becomes  the  major  axis  of  struggle  against  such
accumulation.
9 Recent work on the politics of caste in India’s “new land wars” illustrate the diverse
ways  in  which  claims  to  land  “shape  realigned  or  reimagined  caste  identities”
(Nielsen et al.  2020:685).  These  studies  show  that  “caste  consistently  mediates  land
transfers … by pre-empting, undermining or fuelling processes of social contestation”
(Nielsen et al. 2020:684–85). The authors argue further that while “caste has historically
shaped control of and access to land, recent changes to the political economy of land
have  had  a  direct  bearing  on  caste  as  social  relation  and  practice”  (Nielsen et al.
2020:685).
10 Building on these insights, in this paper we explore how the historical relations that
bound different caste groups to land—and to each other—have shaped strategies of
accumulation  and  resistance  on  the  edge  of  a  rapidly  growing  city.  We  trace  the
reconfigurations  of  caste  and  land  by  understanding  their  inter-connections
“diachronically  and  conjuncturally,”  as  “recursively  linked  categories  that  are
produced and reproduced in continuous interaction under the influence of the larger
political economy” (Nielsen et al. 2020:685). We are particularly interested in how caste
identity and social power are invoked, reconstituted or sharpened on an urban frontier,
as  land  enters  volatile  real  estate  markets  and  is  transformed  from  a  factor  of
production  in  agriculture  to  a  key  source  of  financial  and  speculative  value
(Goldman 2020).  Specifically,  we  ask  how  caste  is  reconfigured  as  a  mode  of
accumulation as well as an axis of struggles around land. In doing so, we contribute to
an understanding of the processes by which urban peripheries are co-produced by the
social interactions of various groups, whether acting in concert or at cross-purposes.
 
Urbanizing Villages, Financializing Land
11 Bengaluru’s spectacular growth and transformation since the 1990s as it became a key
center of India’s software outsourcing industry forms the backdrop to this paper. The
rising demand for commercial and residential properties accelerated the spread of the
city into its rural periphery, swallowing up thousands of hectares of agricultural land—
a spatial expansion that is periodically reflected in the redrawing of the metropolitan
boundary  and  the  master  plan  (Sundaresan 2017).  Between  1971  and  2011,  the
geographical  area  of  the  Bengaluru Metropolitan Region (which includes  Bangalore
Urban and Bangalore Rural districts) expanded four times to 710 sq km, while cropland
shrunk to 7 percent of the area (Purushothaman and Patil 2019:121). The population of
Bengaluru increased from 6.5 million in 2001 to 9.6 million in 2011, to an estimated 12.3
million in 2020.  Much of  this  demographic growth was due to the incorporation of
surrounding settlements into the city.  In 1991,  189 villages of  Bangalore North and
South districts were brought under Bangalore Urban Agglomeration (Nair 2005:147),
and  another  110  villages  were  incorporated  into  the  city  in  2007  when  the  new
municipal  authority,  Greater  Bangalore  Municipal  Corporation  (the  BBMP),  was
created.
12 The rapid expansion of Bengaluru into its hinterland has been driven by government
land  acquisition  for  infrastructure  and  industrial  projects  and  by  private  market
Caste at the City’s Edge: Land Struggles in Peri-urban Bengaluru
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 26 | 2021
4
transactions for real estate development—both leading to the widespread alienation
and  financialization  of  agrarian  land  (Goldman 2020).  Bengaluru’s  “neoliberal
urbanization” (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2009)2 is most visible in the sprawling IT
(information technology) campuses and upscale residential and commercial complexes
that dominate the landscape of newer areas of the city, particularly on the southern
and eastern fringes. But villages even far beyond the city’s official boundary have also
been transformed, as land aggregators and real estate companies created “land banks”
in anticipation of future demand. The spiraling demand for land and water has led to
the  decline  of  agriculture  in  numerous  villages  surrounding  the  city  and  to  the
conversion of large swathes of agricultural land into (actual or anticipated) urban real
estate.
13 While  numerous  studies  have  documented  the  consequences  of  compulsory  land
acquisition for  infrastructure  development,  Special  Economic  Zones  (SEZs)  and real
estate projects (Banerjee-Guha 2010; Levien 2018), there has been less research on the
more  piecemeal  and  incremental  processes  through  which  agricultural  land  is
transformed  into  urban  real  estate  (Ghertner 2014).  Goldman (2020)  points  to  the
extensive  appropriation  and  conversion  of  smallholder  farmland  and  the  rural
commons  on  the  northern  fringe  of  Bengaluru,  a  process  that  requires  a  “deeper
understanding of social, political, and institutional dynamics, rural and urban” (p. 3). In
this paper we describe these quotidian, small-scale, “informal” and “illegal” modalities
through which agrarian land becomes real estate, and the caste struggles that have
erupted around the land transition in one peri-urban site. This process of change, as in
similar cases elsewhere in India, is marked by “relentless negotiations, speculations,
contestations,  displacements,  and  dispossessions  [that]  produce  new urban subjects
and social formations” (Gururani and Dasgupta 2018:42).
14 The paper draws on three years of fieldwork in several villages on the southeastern
edge of Bengaluru. This area was selected for a larger study because it is the location of
one of the city’s largest apartment complexes, “Lakeview Haven,” developed on over
100 acres of land acquired from farmers and landowners of “G-halli” (see Figure 1). A
major aim of the research was to understand how land was assembled for the Lakeview
Haven project, tracing the chain of intermediaries who facilitated the process (Gidwani
and Upadhya N.d.). However, we soon discovered that agricultural and common lands
were being converted for other purposes as well, in diverse and more incremental ways
—especially  informal  (and  even  “illegal”)  practices  and  transactions.3 The  ever-
increasing demand for land has pulled “outside” money into local land markets, driving
up  prices  and  attracting  a  range  of  investors  and  speculators.  Apart  from  gated
communities  such  as  Lakeview  Haven,  the  area  is  dotted  with  numerous  modest
apartment blocks and high-end “villa” projects, as well as empty “layouts” advertising
plots of land for sale (Figure 2).
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Figure 1: View of Lakeview Haven, a large gated community
 
Figure 2: View of urbanizing village on periphery of Bengaluru
15 This  paper  is  based  mainly  on  research  in  two  villages—G-halli  and  a  neighboring
village, “H-puram”—carried out between 2017 and 2019.4 G-halli is a village of around
580  households  with  a  geographical  area  of  793  hectares,  of  which  32  hectares  is
government land and the remainder private land.5 H-puram has 258 households and
covers 257 hectares. The major landowning group in these villages are Reddys,6 who are
much less  populous  in  Karnataka compared to  Vokkaligas  and Lingayats  (the  main
landholding and politically powerful castes), but occupy a similar position of social and
economic power in the villages where they have settled.7 The other important castes in
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these  villages  are  Dalits  (Adi  Dravida  and  Adi  Karnataka),  Kurubas,  Tigalas,  and
Lingayats.
16 We do not have detailed empirical data on the distribution of land by caste for these
villages, but interviews indicate that Reddys are by far the major landowners, followed
by Kurubas and Tigalas.  The Village Revenue Officer  estimated in  2018 that  only  5
percent of the land in G-halli was held by Scheduled Caste (SC) households. This region
is  characterized  by  small  peasant  farming:  nearly  half  of  agricultural  holdings  in
Bangalore Rural district in 1998–99 were “marginal” (below 1 hectare).  In the taluk
where our study villages are situated, 57 percent of the holdings were marginal, while
only 4 percent of holdings were 4 hectares or above (Government of India 2005:18).
Although Reddys and Kurubas are the major landowners in these villages, it appears
that many Dalit families at one time held small parcels of land, mostly land granted
under various land distribution programs. But as we detail below, their access to land
has been eroded over time while the hold of Reddys has strengthened.
17 Agriculture  on  the  southern  Karnataka  plateau  is  dependent  on  rainfall  and  tank
irrigation and is carried out primarily on small family farms which produce food grains
(especially  ragi)  for  consumption  as  well  as  some  cash  crops  (Purushothaman  and
Patil 2019). Prior to around 2005, farmers in G-halli grew staple crops such as ragi, rice
and pulses, produced vegetables and fruits for the market, and engaged in dairying and
sericulture. Around half of the cultivated land was irrigated with water from tanks,
lakes and borewells, while the rest was rainfed. However, agriculture has been largely
abandoned and most  of  the  land  converted  to  other  purposes.  Land sales  in  these
villages have been driven largely by lack of water for irrigation: tanks and lakes dried
up as run-off channels were blocked by construction activities, and the water table has
declined drastically due to excessive extraction of groundwater—first for eucalyptus
plantations  and  later  for  sale  to  the  city’s  “water  mafia”  (Ranganathan 2014).
Cultivators also cite labor shortage as an important reason for giving up agriculture,
reflecting the movement of  Dalits  out of  the agrarian economy and dependence on
Reddy  landlords.  In  K-puram,  some  land  is  still  under  cultivation,  but  rather  than
cultivating multiple crops as in the past, many farmers grow only a single crop of ragi
during the rainy season, or simply leave the land fallow. Several farmers have switched
to dairying because fodder is more easily available (collected from the nearby lake) or
can be grown without irrigation.
18 With the decline of agriculture and rapid urbanization, most households in G-halli have
switched  to  other  economic  activities.  Most  of  the  younger  generation  of  Reddy
landowning families have been educated to college level and are employed in white
collar or professional occupations in Bengaluru and other cities of India (as well  as
abroad).  Reddys  belonging  to  the  older  generation  have  moved  into  local  business
activities  such  as  land  brokerage  and  moneylending,  or  they  have  become  rentier
landlords—constructing apartment blocks with small rental units. Most Reddy families
have  sold  at  least  some  of  their  land  and  used  the  proceeds  to  purchase  urban
properties or agricultural land farther from the city where prices are lower.
19 When agriculture was still the mainstay of the village economy, most Dalits worked as
agricultural wage laborers, cultivated their own or leased land, and/or were engaged in
other  livelihood  activities  such  as  dairying.  With  the  mushrooming  of  apartment
complexes, schools and commercial ventures in the area, they now prefer to work in
the new service economy as gardeners, security guards, or housekeeping staff. Others
Caste at the City’s Edge: Land Struggles in Peri-urban Bengaluru
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 26 | 2021
7
have  taken  up  informal  employment  as  construction  workers,  petty  vendors,  or
domestic help. Several younger Dalits have received higher education and shifted to
urban and white-collar occupations or, like Reddys, have become land brokers.
20 An important new source of income for both groups is land brokerage, or “real estate
business”—as all kinds of land-related activities are called locally. Reddy landowners of
G-halli were the first to enter this business, becoming land market intermediaries and
inserting themselves into the multi-scalar networks that link local land markets into
wider circuits of accumulation (Gidwani and Upadhya N.d.). Some have become small
builders or contractors while others specialize in making layouts and selling the house
sites.  While  large  land  deals  are  brokered  mainly  by  Reddys,  Dalit  agents  such  as
Shekhar tend to handle smaller transactions—particularly the sale of house sites or the
mediation  of  property  disputes.  “Mallesha,”  a  Dalit  real  estate  agent  from  a
neighboring village, explained that customers (even Dalits) prefer to work with Reddy
brokers:  “They  think  Reddys  know  everything  and  everyone  in  the  Revenue
Department offices, so they trust Reddys more.” However, Shekhar said that he handles
cases for people of different communities, including Reddys and Kurubas. Shekhar’s
work takes him to the local Revenue Department and Sub-registrar offices where, like
other village-level brokers, he negotiates with lower-level officials and engages “touts”
to access relevant documents and get the clearances needed to cement land deals.
21 In the following section, we detail the roles of brokers in the agrarian land transition.
To contextualize our findings, we first provide some details on the history, agrarian
structure and political economy of the Mysore region.
 
Land and caste in Mysore: Regional political economy
22 Before the formation of Karnataka state in 1967, the “Southern Maidan” region (where
Bengaluru  is  located)  formed  part  of  the  Mysore  princely  state.  The  land  revenue
administration  system  in  Mysore  derived  from  the  precolonial  “Palegar”  (poligar) 
system, in which semi-autonomous provinces were administered by officials appointed
by the king to collect taxes, protect villages, and maintain tank irrigation systems. At
the  village  level,  the  “Ayagar” (ayagar)  system  institutionalized  the  traditional
occupations and duties of the various castes.8 Hereditary households from each caste
carried out services for the village and were remunerated with a share of the harvest or
the grant of inam lands (Wilks 1810:118, cited in Kashyap and Purushothaman 2017:9).9
While  Vokkaligas,  Kurubas,  Lingayats  and  other  cultivating  castes  controlled  the
agrarian economy of Mysore,  the former “untouchable” castes—mainly Holeyas and
Madigas—provided  the  labor.  These  castes  also  had  designated  “traditional”
occupations—the  “right-hand”  Holeyas  were  village  servants  while  the  “left-hand”
Madigas (now Adi Karnataka) were leather workers.10 As a consequence of social reform
movements  in  the  early  20th century,  Holeyas  are  now  known  as  Adi  Dravida  and
Madigas as Adi Karnataka. Holeyas also use “Chalavadi”—a name recently revived
through a caste assertion and unification movement.11
23 Thus, the rural economy as well as the governance of land in old Mysore were clearly
structured by caste, a legacy that is reflected in contemporary caste relations, identities
and struggles.  However,  in  contrast  to  the  irrigated rice-growing belts  of  southern
India where the “untouchable” castes were mainly agricultural laborers not permitted
to hold land (Kumar 1965;  Viswanath 2014),  in Mysore it  appears that lower-ranked
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groups could take up land for cultivation, at least in the dryland areas (Kashyap and
Purushothaman  2017:11).  However,  the  structure  of  landholding  remained  sharply
stratified by caste, with most land held by middle-ranking castes such as Vokkaligas,
Lingayats and Kurubas.
24 During the colonial period, the intersections of caste, political power and land were
reconfigured  in  important  ways.  Although  the  “Ryotwari”  system  of  land  revenue
administration introduced by the British created individual property rights in land and
a direct relation between the cultivator and the state, Manor (1989) argues that the
“processes of land settlement and revenue collection tended to be mediated through
the village headmen and their close allies who in the large majority of villages were
drawn from the dominant landowning groups” (p. 328). He traces the consolidation of
the social power of the propertied agrarian castes to this period, when the “traditional
prerogatives of the land-owning groups” were upheld by the state (Manor 1989:330). By
the  mid-20th century,  Gowdas  (Vokkaligas)  had  gained  control  over  land  in  most
Mysore villages,  and these “dominant castes” (Srinivas 1959) gradually forged wider
networks and became powerful actors in state-level politics (Manor 1989). 
25 The region was characterized by smallholder family cultivation, with a relatively high
proportion  of  owner-cultivators  and  a  low  incidence  of  landless  laborers  (Manor
1989:328). Dalit and other lower-caste households held or leased small parcels of land,
which they cultivated with family labor, in addition to working as wage laborers (Damle
1986:1904;  Manor  1989:334).  Despite  the  skewed  distribution  of  land,  Dalits  in
Karnataka  have  had  greater  access  to  land  compared  to  other  south  Indian  states
(Manor 1989:359). Although land reforms in Karnataka during the 1960s and 1970s were
not very effective, they may have led to a more equitable distribution of agricultural
land in the southern dryland region (Damle 1989:1903; Manor 1989:344–45). A village
study in Bangalore district in the 1990s found that most SC households had acquired
lands through land distribution programs, but the land grants had been negotiated by
their Vokkaliga patrons who then purchased the land from them (Karanth 1998:96)—
harbingers of the contemporary practice of “grabbing” Dalit lands discussed below.
26 To sum up, the agrarian political economy of Mysore allowed some scope for Dalits to
hold land,  but  the structuring of  the village economy by caste  created relations of
inequality and dependence as well as place-embedded cultural identities that still find
expression in the region.
 
The Great Peri-urban Land Grab
27 The land market in this peri-urban site started to heat up in the 1990s, when two major
real estate companies started buying up land. In such contexts, sleepy agricultural land
markets with relatively stable prices are suddenly shocked into motion, pushing up
land  values  and  tempting  farmers  to  cash  in  on  their  land.  However,  due  to
jurisdictional  differences  between  G-halli  and  H-puram,  land  markets  operate  very
differently in the two villages.
28 G-halli  was  incorporated  into  Bengaluru  municipality  when  the  boundary  was
expanded  in  2007,  bringing  the  village  into  the  “yellow  zone”  of  the  Revised
Comprehensive Development Plan 2015.12 This important administrative change meant
that  agricultural  land  could  more  easily  be  converted  to  non-agricultural  uses,
attracting speculators and developers. By the time of our research (2017–20), around 80
Caste at the City’s Edge: Land Struggles in Peri-urban Bengaluru
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 26 | 2021
9
percent of the agricultural land in G-halli had already been sold, including 120 acres for
the  Lakeview  Haven  project,  and  60  percent  had  been  legally  converted  to  non-
agricultural purposes. In contrast, H-puram remains in the “green belt” (but located
just outside the municipal boundary) where the sale, conversion and development of
agricultural  land  is  prohibited,  except  for  specified  purposes.  Nonetheless,  land  is
rapidly  changing  hands  and  being  converted  to  non-agricultural  purposes  in  this
village as well.
29 While farmers in G-halli were able to sell their land to developers or legally convert it
for other purposes, land-use change in H-puram has taken place largely through illicit
or  quasi-legal  procedures  pursued  by  local  landlords  and  politicians,  reflecting  the
“frontier  urbanism”  of  such  transitional  zones  (Gururani  and  Dasgupta 2018).  Our
interlocutors spoke mainly about two kinds of land-grabbing—the occupation of gomala 
or government lands and the illicit appropriation or purchase of Dalit lands.
 
Capturing common lands
30 The progressive appropriation of gomala and other kinds of public land forms a key part
of  the  Dalit  subaltern  history  of  dispossession  in  Karnataka.  Such  land  (which is
supposed to be controlled by the panchayat) was traditionally used by all communities
for grazing cattle and other livelihood activities. But gomala and other vacant lands are
often cultivated informally,  especially  by  Dalits.13 In  G-halli,  gomala lands  had been
gradually  converted to  other  uses  before  the land rush (mainly  through panchayat
decisions),  such  as  providing  house  sites  for  the  poor  or  creating  graveyards  or
recreational grounds, while some had been captured by local leaders by manipulating
land records. But H-puram still  had some gomala lands, which became the target of
land-grabbing  after  2005.  For  example,  Reddy  landlords  have  built  educational
institutions, clubs and marriage halls on such lands—a permitted use with government
permission (obtainable for those with political connections). More significant has been
the creation of unauthorized layouts on these open lands (Figure 3).14
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Figure 3: Residential layout at H-puram
31 The conversion of  agricultural  land into layouts has historically  been an important
route for the creation of new housing in Bengaluru (Nair 2005:160), as is evident in the
many “revenue layouts” that dot the city.15 Revenue layouts are usually formed without
government sanction but over time become “regularized” or attain quasi-legal status,
often  through  political  influence  (Balakrishnan  and  Pani 2020;  Benjamin  and
Raman 2011). One way in which layouts are created in the green belt is under certain
panchayat rules that allow change of land use, but technically this does not constitute
legal conversion of agricultural land.16 A second method of land use change (for plots of
more than 10 acres) is called “DC conversion,” i.e., with the permission of the District
Commissioner.  Layouts  in  peri-urban  areas  mostly  remain  vacant—house  sites  are
purchased mainly by middle-class urban residents for investment rather than to build
homes. The spectacle of barren plots of converted agricultural land on the outskirts of
growing cities (Upadhya 2018) mirrors on a smaller scale the vacant land left by unbuilt




32 The second major issue highlighted by our interlocutors was the appropriation of Dalit
lands.  Several Dalit  interlocutors  claimed  that  their  communities  used  to  own  a
significant  amount of  land in  these villages,  which gradually  fell  into the hands of
Reddys. They outlined several routes through which this land grab was accomplished.
33 First, Dalit holdings were often grant lands, which legally cannot be sold or alienated
but often change hands informally, leading to ambiguities of ownership.17 Developers
avoid buying “SC lands” because of their lack of “clear title,” which means that Dalits
are excluded from the more lucrative land deals (such as for Lakeview Haven) and are
forced to  engage  in  informal  transactions  if  they  wish  to  sell  land,  often  at  below
market prices.18 Those who purchase land from Dalits generally have the political clout
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to  get  the  sale  regularized and the  land registered,  after  which they  can sell  it  to
another party at a higher price. Our interlocutors said that many Dalits in these villages
had  sold  their  land  to  Reddy  landlords  in  this  way—usually  because  they  were  in
financial distress or were coerced through various means.
34 “Santosh” is a Dalit activist from a neighboring village. He is affiliated with “DPA,”19 a
city-based Dalit association and has been leading the local struggle against this kind of
land-grabbing. He told us that Dalits in his village had experienced extreme “dabbalike”
(exploitation)  and  “dourjanya” (oppression/violence)  over  the  past  twenty  years
because “local leaders” had made them sell their land cheap: “If a piece of land was
worth one crore they gave the Dalits twenty lakhs.” When asked why Dalits would sell
at this price, he responded, “We wouldn’t have seen lakhs [of rupees], no?” Illustrating
this process, he said that his own family had sold 2.5 acres to a developer in 2007: “Back
then, we did not know what was happening, but now after so many years, things are
becoming clear.” He spoke about the underhanded tactics used by brokers, working on
behalf  of  developers,  to  prise  land  from  farmers,  for  instance  by  creating  “fights
between brothers.”
35 Second, Reddys have acquired land through moneylending, appropriating land pledged
by Dalits as collateral when they were unable to repay the debt. Several respondents
recounted cases where Dalits took loans from Reddy landlords to cover marriage or
medical expenses and then lost their land: “Like this, the poor farmers give away their
lands for their loans which will be accumulated by the rich, who then sell it for crores.
The rich become richer and we are becoming poorer.”20
36 Third,  Dalit  lands  can  be  appropriated  by  bribing  Revenue  Department  officials  to
falsify land records (cf. Reddy and Reddy 2007), especially because such land tends to
have  unclear  or  “fuzzy”  titles  (Pati 2019).  Our  interlocutors  spoke  often  about  the
venality of Revenue officers:  “Duddu maadod onde guri  [their only motive is to make
money].”  Dalit  activists  believe  that  “anything  can  be  done  with  land”  if  one  has
enough money, and that Reddys have the greatest capacity to persuade government
officials to ignore land use violations or manipulate land records.
37 In  summary,  the urban land transition in our site  has  disproportionately  benefited
Reddy landowners, due to their legacy control over land and their involvement in “real
estate”—an  outcome  that  is  reflected  in  the  ostentatious  new  bungalows  built  by
several Reddy families (see Figure 4). But they would not have been able to carry out
such activities without solid political support, as we outline next.
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Figure 4: House of a rich Reddy in G-halli
 
Politics of land-grabbing
38 The broader context of the conflicts that we observed in these peri-urban villages is the
long-standing entanglement of political power with land in Karnataka, known for its
“real estate politicians” (Pani 2017) who have built their careers on wealth gained from
land deals and on creating housing layouts for their “vote banks” (Balakrishnan and
Pani 2020). The stories that we recorded in these peri-urban villages draw on wider
narratives  about  corruption  that  circulate  widely  in  the  city  (Doshi  and
Ranganathan 2017), especially after land-grabbing became a major public issue in the
1990s. Numerous cases of illegal encroachments and constructions on government land
(including  water  bodies)  came  to  light  and  were  blamed  for  the  city’s  increasing
congestion and rapid environmental degradation. The committee that was appointed to
look  into  the  matter,  headed  by  A.T.  Ramaswamy,  found  that  45,000  acres  of
government  land  worth  50,000  crore  rupees  had  been  encroached  (Joint  House
Committee, Karnataka Legislature 2006, 2007). The report also revealed that politicians
had  participated  in  land-grabbing  at  all  levels  and  across  party  lines.  Dalit
organizations in Bengaluru have been active in monitoring land-grabbing in the wake
of  these  revelations,  yet  it  continues  largely  unchecked due  to  the  involvement  of
powerful politicians. Nagappa told us that anyone who questioned such activities would
be targeted by “rowdies.”
39 The connections between political power and land became starkly evident in our study
villages, albeit on a smaller scale. Several interlocutors spoke about the “network” of
corruption that enables the accumulation of land in the hands of a few, asserting that
everyone  from  the  Minister,  Revenue  Secretary,  MLA  (Member  of  the  Legislative
Assembly), and District Commissioner (top state officials) down to the local Revenue
Inspector,  Tahsildar  and  Village  Accountant  all  play  a  role  in  facilitating  such
transactions, taking their cut out of the bribes paid. This “network,” which includes
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local  landowners  and brokers,  became apparent  in  the  case  of  “G-halli  Club.”  This
private  recreational  and  social  club,  situated  on  a  road  leading  out  of  G-halli  and
surrounded by open fields,  was established by a group of  Reddy residents with the
support  of  the  local  MLA.  They  were  granted  six  acres  of  gomala  land  by  the
government on a 30-year lease.21 The club has become an important place where local
residents, party workers, and real estate agents meet to discuss politics and land deals
over food and beer. The club is frequented by affluent local Reddys but rarely by Dalits.
The gatherings we witnessed at the club illustrate how Reddy landowners and brokers
cultivate caste and party connections to oil the wheels of their real estate businesses.
40 Members  of  the  “big”  Reddy  families  already  had  political  connections  before  the
recent land boom because they occupied most of the local elected positions when G-
halli  was  still  governed  by  the  panchayat  system.  Reddy  landowners  in  H-puram
similarly benefit from patronage relations with city- and state-level politicians. These
political networks are manifested in various ways. For instance, local Reddys may serve
as  “benamis” (proxies)  for  big  politicians,  who  use  land  deals  to  generate election
funding and launder “black money,” in return for which they get support for their land
dealings. Whenever we asked about land transactions, our interlocutors (of all castes)
would mention the local MLA, who is said to have purchased 300–400 acres in the area,
all in the names of his supporters. “This is a new mafia that is making crores of rupees,”
Nagappa exclaimed.
41 The importance of political patronage became clear during the 2018 Karnataka State
Assembly  elections,  when  both  Reddys  and  Dalits  campaigned  vigorously  for  their
candidates  for  the  position  of  MLA.  Reddys  in  these  villages  mostly  support  the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (which has been in power in Karnataka for several years),
while Dalits usually vote for the Congress Party. Reddy brokers and landlords donated
substantial  funds  to  the  campaign  of  the  sitting  BJP  MLA because,  as  they  told  us
frankly,  they  had  done  well  during  his  last  three  terms  in  office.  They  were  also
determined to defeat the Congress candidate because they feared that their real estate
businesses  would  be  adversely  affected  if  he  were  to  win. Conversely,  Dalits
campaigned vigorously for the Congress candidate because they viewed defeating the
BJP as central to their battle against land-grabbing. Despite their efforts, the BJP MLA
was re-elected for a fourth term.
42 While Reddys cultivate political  networks beyond the village to shore up their  real
estate activities, Dalit youth do the same—but mainly through Dalit associations rather
than mainstream political parties. Several Dalit brokers of these villages also work as
activists with city-based Dalit organizations. Indeed, it was noteworthy that the most
politically  active  individuals  in  these  villages—both  Reddys  and  Dalits—make  their
livings as land market intermediaries. For Reddys this is not surprising, given the close
linkages between land and political money in Bengaluru. Although we were puzzled at
first by this convergence in the case of Dalits, the logic eventually became clear. In the
next section we show how Dalit brokers draw on city and state-level Dalit organizations
to help navigate the land bureaucracy, and also utilize their knowledge of the land
business and connections with government officials to contest land-grabbing.
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Fighting for Land, Contesting Caste
43 From long interviews with several Dalit brokers, we learned that their involvement in
the real estate business is not driven only by economic motives but also by the desire to
challenge Reddy dominance. For example, Nagappa said that his 15 years of experience
as a broker had given him an understanding of Revenue Department procedures which
enabled him to collect evidence of land-grabbing. He could recite from memory the
survey numbers of all the contested plots of land in his village and recount the cases in
detail—of  encroachments  on  Scheduled  Caste  grant  lands,  gomala (common)  lands,
lakes and ponds, and temple lands—and who was involved. Nagappa had collected thick
files of paperwork to prove his allegations.
44 The life histories of Dalit  broker-activists further help to unravel how Dalit  politics
have become entangled with the land market. Shekhar had studied in a local English
medium school and then enrolled in college, but he dropped out before finishing and
joined a private company. It was never his intention to get into “real estate,” he said,
but he got involved in the business after fighting a court case that his family had filed
against a powerful local Reddy landlord. “Subba Reddy” had been acquiring land in the
village on behalf of a developer. When Shekhar’s father refused to sell, Subba Reddy
“grabbed” the land by producing a faked General Power of Attorney (GPA).22 Shekhar’s
father filed a case against him, which languished in court for years until Shekhar took
it up and finally won. Shekhar explained that it was fighting this case that made him
aware of the extent of land-grabbing in the area,  and he began helping other Dalit
families to reclaim land they had lost. This in turn led him to join “ADP,” a Bengaluru-
based Dalit organization, to draw on its support in fighting these cases.
45 Although he  makes  his  living  a  broker,  Shekhar  spends  most  of  his  time on  land-
grabbing cases. Like Nagappa, he says that fighting a land case gave him the experience
to work as a broker, while working in real estate in turn has helped him to oppose land-
grabbing. Indeed, these two activities are practically inseparable: Shekhar revealed that
when he discovers cases of Dalit lands that have been transferred to other names, he
approaches the original owners and offers to file a case on their behalf. If they agree, he
covers  the  costs  of  litigation himself,  and if  he  wins  the  case  he  takes  part  of  the
recovered  land  to  cover  his  costs  and  remuneration.  Thus,  contesting  the  illicit
appropriation of land is a part of his “real estate business.”
46 Similarly,  Santosh (introduced above)  fights  against  land-grabbing with the help of
DPA. He explained that being a member of DPA gave him the confidence to approach
government authorities, and that he is able to “get work done” because officers in the
BBMP ward office or panchayat offices know and respect him. Santosh also mentors
local  Dalit  youth  who have  “put  cases  on  land,”  suggesting  that  this  is  a  common
activity. According to Santosh, the Reddys had anticipated that prices would rise in this
area and therefore started buying up whatever land they could. Later, when Dalits saw
that their land was being resold at a profit,  they felt  they had been “cheated” and
began  to  file  cases  to  reclaim  their  property  (by  showing  that  the  original  land
transaction was illegal). Shekhar, Santosh and other Dalit broker-activists specialize in
such cases.
47 One day, Sachin accompanied Shekhar and four other residents of H-puram to a
meeting  at  the  Deputy  Commissioner’s  (DC)  office  that  had  been  arranged  by
“Manjunath,” the state president of ADP. The recently appointed Deputy Commissioner
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had agreed to the meeting after the ADP had protested his lack of attention to Dalit
concerns. In a strong voice, Manjunath—a confident and straightforward man in his
fifties—explained  each  issue  to  the  DC,  handing  over  files  that  had  been  carefully
compiled to support their claims. The issues ranged from atrocities against Dalits and
the need for  basic  infrastructure  in  Dalit  colonies,  to  the  allocation of  house  sites,
encroachment of common lands, and “cheating” of farmers by developers. Manjunath
also requested the DC to take action against corrupt officials, whom he named. As the
cases  were  presented  one  by  one,  the  junior  officers  at  the  meeting  appeared
increasingly uncomfortable as they had to answer tough questions from both the DC
and Manjunath. On almost every matter raised, the DC agreed that Manjunath had a
valid case and directed his officers to “take action against these illegal activities.”23
48 The way in which this meeting unfolded suggests that Dalit organizations have some
political leverage with the government. By aligning with these organizations, activists
such as Shekhar are able to frame land-grabbing as an issue of caste exploitation. Thus,
while Reddys have profited from the land boom by deploying caste networks or “caste
capital,” Dalit activists contest such accumulation by drawing on their own networks.
Specifically,  they  call  on  a  political  identity  that  has  been  created  and  reinforced
through  a  long  history  of  Dalit  mobilization  in  the  state  (Davidappa  and
Shivanna 2013).  In  the  city  of  Bengaluru,  such  mobilization  has  been  particularly
focused on land and housing rights for the urban poor (Benjamin and Raman 2011:41;
Kamath and Vijayabaskar 2014).  In this struggle,  Shekhar and his allies are not just
protesting  against  the  appropriation  of  Dalit  and  common  lands  through  illegal
machinations and the political influence of Reddys—they are making a collective claim
about  caste  power  and  using  their  identity  as  oppressed  Dalits  to  “hail  the  state”
(Mitchell 2018), to insist that officials attend to their grievances and discharge their
responsibilities. As Shekhar said:
Ambedkar is like a railway engine and we are like railway compartments. When we
go through Dalit organizations, our land-related work will be done immediately.
Otherwise, it would have been very difficult.
49 This discussion reminds us that, historically, claims to land have been collective, in the
sense that dominant landowning castes assert their collective right to control land (as
well as the labor of the lower castes) in their villages. Although land is converted into
real  estate  through  numerous  individual  negotiations  and  transactions,  the  urban
transition can proceed only by activating or building on social connections—of caste,
but  also  patron-client  relations  with  powerful  politicians  and  state  functionaries.
Similarly,  Dalit  resistance  to  land-grabbing  is  mounted collectively,  by  invoking an
historically embedded consciousness of caste oppression and utilizing knowledge and
practices that have been honed through long-standing struggles for land rights and
social justice. While rural Dalits draw on the experience of urban Dalits in claiming
rights to land in their urbanizing villages, locally dominant caste actors reinforce their
hegemony by rescaling their political networks.
 
Materiality of caste and land
50 Dalit activists’ passionate fight against land-grabbing might suggest that their struggle
is primarily about social justice and to challenge the power of Reddys, yet a closer look
reveals  that  the  situation  is  not  so  straightforward.  For  example,  even  as  Shekhar
contests the formation of unauthorized layouts by Reddys, he himself had participated
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in  creating a  layout  on greenbelt  land and selling the house sites.  When we asked
whether he would get  into trouble for  this,  he confidently replied that  there is  no
“dispute”  on  the  land  and  that  the  buyers  can  easily  get  their  plots  regularized.
However, it appears that this venture did not go smoothly, for on another occasion he
told Sachin angrily,  “Reddygalu maadidre  okay,  aadre  dalitaru maadidre  rocchigeltare  [if
Reddys do illegal things it’s okay, but if Dalits do the same, it infuriates them].”
51 Shekhar not only makes his living as a broker, he has also engaged in dubious activities
like  those  of  the  Reddys  he  criticizes.  Similarly,  his  fight  to  recover  his  family’s
property (described above)  was motivated by the potential  to profit  from the land,
which  had  been  worth  little  prior  to  the  land  boom.  After  Shekhar  succeeded  in
recovering the land (a plot of just under 1 acre), he sold it to Subba Reddy’s son for one
crore rupees. This example suggests that the Dalit struggle in these peri-urban villages
is  not  only  about  contesting  accumulation  by  Reddys,  but  also  reflects  a  desire  to
participate in—and benefit from—the new land market on the same footing. Indeed,
Shekhar mentioned that it was only when he fought the case that he realized the value
of the family land they had lost.
52 More broadly, Shekhar and other activists are not critical of the rapid urbanization of
their villages nor of the repurposing of common land for monetary gain—rather, their
fight is against the monopoly of Reddys in these processes. To them, fighting against
land-grabbing and profiting from the land market are not antithetical  activities.  As
Manjunath (the ADP leader) told the group gathered at the DC’s office that day: “Sanna
putta kelasa madisikolli, sanghatane kattri. Maadbeku, dudibeku, matte neevu beliri, summne
kudilike  hogbedri  [get  small  things  done  (from  the  DC’s  office)  and  build  the
organization.  Work,  earn  well,  grow  and  don't  spend  it  all  on  drinking!]”  This
statement suggests that a collective movement against caste oppression and for land
rights, fighting individual land cases, and generating value from “real estate” are not
contradictory goals  for  these  Dalits.  Shekhar and other  local  activists  have learned
from the experience of  city-based Dalit  organizations,  which have long carried out
struggles for rights to the land on which informal settlements (largely occupied by
Dalits) are built, thereby staking claims to property ownership rather than just housing
rights or citizenship. As Roy (2017:A3) argues, subordinated groups may assert rights
through a “politics of property” rather than political mobilization alone.
53 This account of a land struggle in peri-urban Bengaluru brings us back to the question
of caste and land, highlighting the materiality of caste. Questioning why higher caste
groups should monopolize the benefits of urbanization and the booming real estate
market, Dalit activists challenge caste power on multiple levels—by appealing to the
administration and the courts for justice, by uncovering and contesting cases of illicit
land-grabbing,  and through electoral  politics  and social  movements.  However,  they
know  that  they  remain  relatively  powerless  in  a  context  where  state  actors  and
political leaders are at the center of the “land mafias” that control these processes of
dispossession.
 
Entanglements and genealogies of place and land
54 The land struggle described here could be read as an example of “subaltern citizenship”
or  “insurgent  citizenship”  (Holston 2008;  Nilsen 2016),  where  marginalized  groups
assert their rights as equal citizens. However, while making claims on the state through
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the language of rights and on the “terrain of the law” (Nair 2015), these Dalit activists
consistently  foreground  the  caste basis  of  land-grabbing.  Several  researchers  have
suggested that caste identity may be strategically articulated as a political  tactic in
making  claims  on  land  (Benjamin  and  Raman  2011:42;  Nielsen et al. 2020:7;  cf.
Oskarsson and Sareen 2020), but we argue that the invocation of caste in this case is not
just instrumental. Rather, it reflects the specific and very material ways in which land
has been historically embedded in caste in this region, the continuation of caste as a
social structure of accumulation, and the history of Dalit struggles in Karnataka and
Bengaluru around the land question. Further, for actors such as Shekhar, land is not
only a key resource from which they have been excluded, but is also symbolic of their
exclusion as Dalits (cf. Steur 2015).
55 When asked to describe how their villages have changed over the last two decades,
Reddy and Dalit interlocutors alike would begin their stories not in the 1980s or 1990s
but at  some time in the distant past.  They told us about how their  ancestors were
granted land in these villages by a king (in the case of Reddys), or about the honored
place  they  once  held  as  messengers  and  tax  collectors  for  the  king  (Dalits).  Dalits
related how land they had received from Maharaja Krishnaraja Wodeyar was snatched
by  Reddys:  “During  Raja’s  time,  everything  was  fine,  there  used  to  be  rules  and
regulations, but now wealth is going in the reverse direction, i.e., back into the hands of
the upper caste (kottirodu reverse hogbittide).” While such stories are often interpreted as
caste “origin myths” that explain low status in the caste hierarchy (Deliege 1993), they
could  also  be  read  as  sedimented  memories,  or  subaltern  histories,  that  anchor
communities to particular places—especially through their connection to land.24
56 One day, while sitting with Shekhar and Nagappa in the former’s small “sheet house”25
in H-puram, they related the story of the Chalavadi community (to which they belong),
which  was  traditionally  the  guardian  of  the  right-hand caste  order.  One  Chalavadi
family in each village held the hereditary post of village servant or watchman (thoti),
who  represented  the  king.  The  duties  of  the  Thoti included  convening  panchayat
meetings,  collecting taxes,  making official  announcements,  and guarding the village
(Karanth 1998:88). This authority was symbolized by their possession of the gantebattalu
—an ornate brass bell and ladle connected by a chain—which was used to collect taxes.
This instrument is mentioned in the 1911 Census Report, which describes how the Thoti
would convene meetings of the Right-hand castes by going
…. forth carrying a brass cup and chain as insignia, the cup having on it engraved
the badges of different castes composing this section, such as the plough of the
Vakkaliga, the scales of the Banajiga, the shears of a Kuruba, the spade of a Vodda,
the razor of a barber, the washing stone slab and pot of an Agasa and the wheel of a
Kumbara. (Aiyar 1911:167)
57 To  our  surprise,  Shekhar  brought  out  a  beautifully  crafted  gantebattalu that  had
belonged to his grandfather, showing us the symbols of the various castes inscribed
along  its  arm  and  proudly  demonstrating  how  the  instrument  was  used.  For  him,
possession  of  this  gantebattalu was  proof  not  only  of  the  important  role  that  his
community and family had once played in village society, but also of their claim to the
inam land that had been granted to his ancestor (Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Chalavadi Gante Battalu, inherited from Shekhar’s grandfather
58 Dalit narratives about their dispossession by Reddys move beyond living memory or the
recent past, expressing a deeper truth about the historical and contemporary relation
between caste, land and power. By foregrounding their honored position in precolonial
times and highlighting the role of Reddys in their downfall,  they seek to legitimize
their claims to land while contesting the social power of Reddys. These place-embedded
histories  inform the  struggles  that  have  crystallized  more  recently  around land  as
villages are absorbed into the urban fabric. Although land has become detached from
agriculture, the agrarian caste formation continues to structure accumulation through
land, but in new ways. Thus, for Reddys and Dalits alike, land is central to caste identity
as articulated in these histories. The social and symbolic values of land are not erased
or submerged by the disintegration of agrarian life and the financialization of land, but
are reworked and reappear in new ways, as in the contestations described above.
 
Conclusion: Revaluing Land and Caste
59 In this paper we have explored how the intersections of land and caste are reconfigured
in the agrarian-urban transition in Bengaluru, as land is turned into a financial asset
that produces new kinds of value as well as conflicts. We show how the social matrix of
agrarian production, and the historical relations that different caste groups held to
land and to one another, inflect processes of accumulation as well as struggles around
land. Caste identity not only structures who can participate in, and prosper from, the
urban land transition—it is also refashioned and deployed in new ways as peri-urban
land markets are activated. Our analysis also uncovers the reshuffling of the relations
between the state, political class, and caste identity as agrarian communities urbanize.
Caste at the City’s Edge: Land Struggles in Peri-urban Bengaluru
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 26 | 2021
19
60 The analysis shows that while caste inequalities persist, they take on a different form in
these rapidly urbanizing villages, as Dalits move away from their prescribed role in the
agrarian economy, access education, and enter new occupations. Reddys retain their
economic power due to their control over land and other forms of capital, but their
social power and relation with Dalits—now less dependent on them for employment or
patronage—has shifted. Caste solidarity becomes a base for Reddys to forge multi-scalar
political  networks  that  transcend  a  particular  caste,  even  as  they  reinforce  caste
domination at the local level. Sale of land for real estate projects has enriched Reddy
landlords,  who  accumulate  additional  wealth  by  capturing  Dalit  land,  converting
common  land  into  layouts,  and  acting  as  land  market  intermediaries.  Thus,  caste
remains a central axis of accumulation even as it works in diverse ways at different
scales.
61 Dalits have opposed this caste-based mode of accumulation by marshalling the political
resources  available  to  them.  They  draw  on  the  experience  of  Dalit  movements  to
engage with the state on its own terms—invoking the language of law and rights and
foregrounding  the  government’s  obligation  to  protect  Dalits  from  exploitation  and
discrimination. This is not just a politics that uses caste identity in pursuit of other
agendas, but one that derives from an ingrained sense of belonging and rights to land
and recognition which builds on subaltern histories of oppression and struggle. Their
involvement with Dalit movements leads to a reconfiguration of caste identity, one that
draws on an imagined past but strongly engages with contemporary social movements
and aspirations of mobility. At the same time, Dalits—like their Reddy adversaries—
have participated in quotidian processes of urbanization and aspire to engage in similar
strategies of accumulation through land.
62 The deep historical entanglement of land and caste that is illustrated by this study has
been well documented in agrarian and rural studies, yet is only recently coming into
focus in urban scholarship. The conflicts that erupt as agrarian villages urbanize have a
clear  genealogy  in  caste-based  agrarian  structures  and  colonial  and  postcolonial
regimes  of  land  governance,  illustrating  the  importance  of  mapping  how  regional
political economies are refracted in processes of urbanization. This paper also suggests
that caste should not be understood as simply another axis  of  social  and economic
inequality or a basis for political identity that is deployed in certain situations. Rather,
we need to reanimate the notion of caste as a social structure of accumulation, whose
particular characteristics are defined by regionally specific histories of development,
modes  of  production,  systems  of  political  authority,  and  collective  memories  of
oppression and struggle. From this perspective, we can better understand how caste is
repurposed or reassembled as agrarian land takes on new values and affordances—as a
site of speculative investment, a source of investible wealth and social power, and an
axis of struggle.
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NOTES
1. Names  and  identifying  features  of  all  people  and  places  mentioned  in  the  paper  are
anonymized. We retain the name Bangalore in relevant contexts.
2. Following other scholars, I use this term to capture a range of urban and economic reforms
undertaken  in  India  since  the  1990s,  which  dramatically  transformed  the  major  cities.  The
opening up of the real estate sector to 100% foreign direct investment in 2005 was particularly
consequential  (Halbert  and  Rouanet 2014;  Searle 2016)  for  real  estate  development  and  the
financialization of land.
3. Of course, large-scale professional land aggregation and real estate development also involve a
range of informalities and illegalities (Sundaresan 2017), but here our focus is on the smaller-
scale operations of the peri-urban land market.
4. Most of the fieldwork was carried out by Sachin Rathod and Kaveri Medappa, with additional
interviews  conducted  by  other  members  of  the  research  team  between  February  2017  and
February 2020. Sachin lived in G-halli almost continuously for eight months, from August 2018
through March 2019,  conducting interviews and participant observation in a small  cluster of
villages.  This  sustained presence allowed him to  build  good rapport  with interlocutors  from
different caste groups. Although we rely here mainly on conversations with Dalit interlocutors,
their  stories  of  land-grabbing  were  corroborated  by  Reddy  and  Kuruba  informants  and
documentary evidence.
5. G-halli  now forms part  of  a  municipal  ward—the smallest  unit  of  Census enumeration for
urban areas—so we do not have official village-level demographic data. The ward in which G-halli
is situated has a population of 54,625, of which 8,734, or around 16 percent, are Scheduled Caste
(Census  of  India 2011;  https://sw.kar.nic.in/PDF2018/Census2011Village/Bangaloreurban.pdf).
H-puram had a  population of  1,056 in  2011,  of  which 30  percent  belonged to  the Scheduled
Castes.
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6. Reddys  are  a  large  caste  category  of  cultivators  found  mainly  in  Andhra  Pradesh  and
Telangana.  In  Andhra  Pradesh  and  Telangana,  they  are  placed  in  the  “general  category”
(Forward Caste) as they are the major landowning caste in many districts (although some sub-
castes  are  land-poor),  but  in  Karnataka they are  classified as  OBC (Other  Backward Classes).
Reddys hold substantial land and properties in and around Bengaluru, which may also reflect
more recent investments by Reddys from Andhra Pradesh.
7. Because of Bangalore’s location contiguous to Tamil-, Telugu- and Kannada-speaking regions,
the city and its surrounding rural areas have a complex linguistic and caste composition. Reddys
are found mainly in villages to the east and south of the city, while Vokkaligas are the major
landowners on the western and northern sides (Narendar Pani, personal communication, January
21, 2021). The history of Reddy migration to the Mysore region is unclear, but our interlocutors
claimed that their forefathers were granted lands by a king in the precolonial period. Reddys and
Dalits in these villages speak Telugu as well as Kannada, indicating their origin in the Andhra
region.  The  1897  Gazetteer  of  Mysore  lists  “Reddis”  under  the  broad  category  of  “Wokkaliga”
(Vokkaliga), a label that was applied to a broad swathe of cultivating castes. They constituted
one-tenth of the total Wokkaliga population of Bangalore District at that time.
8. Twelve hereditary positions were defined, each linked to a particular caste—Shanbhog (village
accountant, a Brahmin), Patel or Gowda (village leader), artisans such as Kammara (Ironsmith),
Madiga  (Shoemaker),  and  Kumbara (Potter),  and  village  servants  such  as  Toti/Talliari
(Watchman) (Rice 1987:576).
9. Shekhar’s family had 2½ acres of land that his grandfather had received as thoti inam because
he held the position of village watchman.
10. Our interlocutors often used the term “Dalit” while speaking about their political struggles,
but also referred to themselves as Adi Karnataka, Adi Dravida or Chalavadi.
11. In Mysore, as in much of southern India, castes were traditionally divided into left- and right-
hand categories.
12. The  terms  “yellow  belt”  and  “green  belt”  derive  from  the  Bangalore  Comprehensive
Development Plan (CDP), in which yellow designates land zoned for residential purposes while
green is for land (mostly on the periphery of the city) reserved for agriculture or other non-
urban uses (see Nair 2005:158–61). Villages brought into the BBMP in 2007 were automatically re-
zoned as yellow, setting off a land rush in peri-urban areas.
13. Benjamin and Raman (2011) note the increased competition in Bengaluru for land categorized
as “common” or kharab (unsurveyed vacant land).  Such lands were earlier distributed to the
poor,  but since the 1990s it  has been increasingly allocated to infrastructure and real  estate
projects. Cf. Nair (2005:160).
14. A layout is a development carried out on agricultural land which has been partially developed
and divided into plots for sale. Such plots are considered by middle-class urban residents to be
good investments, as land prices (in the popular imagination) “always go up.” The phenomenon
of agricultural land turned into empty layouts—a common sight on the outskirts of smaller cities
as well—points to the democratization of “speculative urbanism” and the popularization of land
as a key site of accumulation (Upadhya 2018, 2021).
15. The  term  refers  to  residential  colonies  formed  on  land  in  the  records  of  the  Revenue
Department (mainly agricultural land).
16. Buyers of such plots receive “B-khata” documents, which they can later use to regularize the
property. “B-khata” refers to a separate BBMP register where irregular properties are listed for
tax purposes (the “A-khata” register is for authorized properties). Such conversions are common
in Bengaluru (526,000 properties are currently listed in the B-khata), hence the BBMP periodically
tries to regularize these properties to generate tax revenues, a move that has been opposed by
civic activists (see:  https://www.deccanherald.com/city/bengaluru-infrastructure/bbmp-could-
legalise-25-lakh-b-khata-properties-to-generate-revenue-827922.html).  The  state  government’s
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Akrama-Sakrama (“illegal-legal”)  regularization  scheme  has  met  with  similar  opposition.  The
constant  pressure  to regularize  properties  created  in  violation  of  laws  and  planning  norms
illustrates the entrenched informality of urban development (Roy 2009).
17. Grant land carries only conditional rights. For example, land can be transferred only within
the same eligible category (such as SC) and after a specified period of time (usually 25 years).
However, there are many ways to circumvent these restrictions, as we show here.
18. Gomala  and  “waste”  lands  have  periodically  been  distributed  to  landless  households
(Karanth 1992), but Dalits and other marginalized groups may also hold “encroached” land which
has been regularized, which is known as “Bagair Hukum” (Gopal 2015:149). Title to both kinds of
land tends to be unclear because of their complicated genealogies. According to Benjamin and
Raman (2011:49), the land record computerization programme in Karnataka reduced numerous
forms of land tenure to a single category, such that only one type of document—one that many
marginal cultivators may not possess—is now considered legal title by the courts. They argue
that  this  change  facilitated  the  accumulation  of  land  by  dominant  groups  while  further
marginalizing groups whose titles to land were unclear.
19. The names of  the  specific  organizations  with which our  interlocutors  are  associated are
anonymized  with  acronyms.  Units  of  several  Dalit  organizations  are  active  in  G-halli  and
neighboring  villages,  including  Dalit  Sangharsh  Samithi  (DSS,  the  oldest  Dalit  association  in
Karnataka), Ambedkar Wada (a Congress Party-affiliated organization), Bhima Wada, and others.
We have not provided more background on Dalit movements in Karnataka or their engagements
in land struggles in the city because it is beyond the scope of this paper and the Special Issue,
although this wider context would be important to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the
complex connections between the land transition and Dalit activism.
20. One crore = 10,000,000; one lakh = 100,000.
21. While  recreational  facilities  for  the  village  can  be  developed  on  green  belt  land  with
government permission, the prohibitive membership fees at G-halli Club (2 to 3 lakh rupees per
year) clearly exclude all but the richest villagers.
22. The  GPA  is  a  document  often  used  in  informal  transactions  through  brokers  as  an
intermediate step to conveying the land to the final buyer. GPAs are also used to hold land in
“benami” (literally, “without name”). The quasi-legal domain constituted by the circulation of
such  instruments  helps  to  explain  how  caste  power  works  in  tandem  with  (or  against)  the
(fractured and porous) state in quotidian practices of accumulation. This is an example of what
Gururani (2013) terms “flexible planning,” in which informal and formal processes and
institutions are deeply interdigitated.
23. We are not aware of the outcome of these cases.
24. We cannot verify to what extent Dalits actually held land in the past or how or when they lost
it. However, the fact that several Dalit respondents related the same story of how Dalit lands fell
into the hands of Reddys—about how they went into debt due to heavy expenditure on the village
festival—this  seems  to  be  more  like  a  caste  “origin  myth”  than  a  collective  memory.  These
narratives  merge  into  accounts  of  more  recent  land-grabbing  by  Reddys,  for  which there  is
sufficient documentary evidence.
25. “Sheet house” refers to the use of corrugated metal or asbestos sheets for roofing, a marker
of poor housing.
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ABSTRACTS
Building on recent literature that explores how the social logics of older agrarian formations are
refracted in processes of urbanization, the paper foregrounds the significance of caste in rapidly
changing peri-urban spaces. Drawing on extended fieldwork in several villages on the outskirts
of  Bengaluru,  it  shows  how  the  twin  scaffoldings  of  agrarian  society—caste  and  land—are
reconfigured as  the values of  land change in this  zone of  transition.  Caste identity not  only
structures who can participate in,  or prosper from, the transformation of agrarian land into
urban real estate—it is also refashioned and deployed in new ways, especially through the politics
of  land.  This  study  demonstrates  why  caste  should  be  understood  as  a  social  structure  of
accumulation, whose specific modes of operation are defined by regionally rooted histories of
development and memories of oppression and struggle.
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